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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CALVIN N. HALL, and 
RITA M. HALL, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. 
Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 18371 
PERRY G. FITZGERALD, 
CAROLYN S. FITZGERALD, 
et a 1. , 
Defendants-
Appel 1 ants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT l 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS THERE WERE GENUINE 
ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL FACTS AND PLAINTIFFS WERE 
NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Plaintiffs claim that "defendants never denied that the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract attached to Mr. Hall's affidavit was not the agreed 
contract" (P. 4). This simply is not true. In their proposed Amended 
Answer defendants asserted that the Exhibit "A" (which was incomplete 
on the Complaint) was not the agreement of the parties as it did not 
contain a release clause as agreed upon. There is nothing in Mr. Hall's 
affidavit which expressly refers to a release clause so that defendants 
would risk being foreclosed -. on that issue for failure to rebut it under 
oath. 
With respect to Rule 56{e), plaintiffs ignore the alternative to an 
affidavit provided therein, to-wit a response "as otherwise provided in 
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this Rule. 11 Before the ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment 
defendants moved to amend their Answer. That motion was not ruled upon 
and hence the conditions set forth in Rule 56(d) were not met, to-wit 
"judgment is not rendered upon the whole case" as the issue as to a 
release clause was not ruled upon and had not been addressed by the 
subject affidavit. Plaintiffs seek to avoid the foregoing by contending 
ipse dix~t that "amendments to defendants' Answer do not substantially 
change the issues as originally formulated" (P. 4). In the next para-
graph, however, it is conceded that it raised the issue of the release 
clause but that·such issue does not constitute a legal defense as it 
"would not affect defendants' liability to make full and timely payment 
to the plaintiffs. 11 Defendants do not contend that such a clause would 
affect their liability to pay as agreed but it certainly would affect 
their ability to make such payments since sales of release ground have 
been the means of performance on this type of contract. At the very least 
the Court could not properly conclude otherwise without an evidentiary 
hearing. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED 
EVIDENCE WHICH BY DUE DILIGENCE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
DISCOVERED AND PRESENTED AT THE TIME THE COURT HEARD 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Plaintiffs contend that the newly discovered evidence (that plaintiffs 
had arranged with their sellers to apply plaintiffs' payment to those 
sellers on the contract which had to be kept current to perform the instant 
2 
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contract) was 11 the exclusive knowledge of defendants-appellants (at 
critical times)- 11 Not so. The newly discovered evidence was not the 
payment made by defendants to Leland Fitzgerald {plaintiffs' seller) 
which initially was in their knowledge to the exclusion of plaintiffs' 
knowledge but rather the application of that payment (to the contract 
referred to in paragraph 11 of the subject contract) rather than the 
retention of that payment by Fitzgerald toward a new contract contem-
plated between him and defendants if ~laT-fttfffs defaulted out. Knowledge 
of the application was exclusively known only to plaintiffs and Fitzgerald 
and the latter's affidavit made it clear that defendants learned of this 
evidence only since the summary judgment was rendered (R. 79). 
Without any support in the record whatsoever plaintiffs maRe the 
pejorative assertion that there was "collusion" between their sellers 
Fitzgerald and the Fitzgerald defendants (P. 6). Certainly neither 
the lower court nor this one may so find without an evidentiary hearing. 
In the same paragraph they assert that the payment was partial which is 
contrary to the facts (R. 79). 
When plaintiffs assert that the payment in question was "without the 
consent or knowledge of the plaintiff" they again confuse the payment 
with its application to their contract with their seller which could only 
have been made with their knowledge and consent. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS PLAINTIFFS HAD NOT 
PASSED TITLE TO DEFENDANTS IN ACCORD WITH PARAGRAPH· 
16 OF THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT. 
3 
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A 
Title was not Properly Passed from Plaintiffs 
to Defendanta via a Warranty Deed Deposited 
with the Fourth Judicial District Court. 
Plaintiffs seek to dispose of this issue with a single sentence 
based entirely on ipse dixit. It is too elementary to require case 
citation to establish the fact that a deed which is lodged in a court 
file does not establish the claim of title necessary to convey good 
marketable title. No authority is given as to the power of defendants 
to remove the deed from the court file even if its location there were 
the only objection to its passing title. Certainly the filing in 
court of a deed in a regular real property transfer would be insufficient 
and the burden is on plaintiffs to establish the validity of such a 
deli very. 
B 
An Issue Not Raised in11the Court Below May Be 
Raised on Appeal when the Lower Court does not 
Conduct a Trial. 
Defendants would agree with this part of plaintiffs brief if the 
case had reached the final stage of where the defense of failure to state 
a claim may be asserted under Rule 12(h) but this case never reached that 
stage and hence it may be raised here since defendants did not have the 
final opportunity to raise it in the lower court at the time provided by 
the rule because of the procedure utilized by the lower ourt. It surely 
is contrary to the spirit of pleading under the rules for the Court not 
to decide causes on the merits unless the rules clearly foreclose that 
being done. 
4 
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c 
Defendants did not Waive Any Objection to 
Plaintiffs' Tender of Title. 
Plaintiffs contend under this point that the defense of failure 
to "pass title to Buyers (defendants)_•l· pursuant to paragraph 16C of 
the subject contract is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded 
specifically under Rule 8{c). Rule 8 , however, lists all the 19 
defenses denominated and this defense is not one of those enumerated. 
As noted above it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to both plead and to 
prove the perfonnance or compliance with every covenant and condition 
to establish a legal claim and Rule S·(c-) does not have the legal effect 
of shifting that burden. Furthermore, as is true with respect to nearly 
every legal proposition urged upon this Court by plaintiffs,plaintiffs 
cite no case precedent to sustain their position on this issue. 
D 
The Fourth Judicial District Court did not 
Properly Foreclose the Subject Unjform Real 
Estate Contract as a Note and Mortgage. 
At this point in their brief plaintiffs concede that "there must be 
a validly executed deed and delivery of the deed" (P. 9). They contend, 
however, that a delivery to the clerk of the court of a deed to be filed 
in the foreclosure file is a valid delivery. No case for this extra-
ordinary proposition is cited. Nor is any authority of the clerk to deliver 
that deed cited. Nor has the judgment appealed from in this case addressed 
that factor. Surely defendants did not bargain merely for a valid "trans-
action between the parties" (P. 9). They bargained for and should receive 
5 
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a deed that gives them good marketable title of record. Certainly the 
deed which is R 84 does not do that. 
Plaintiffs correctly observe that defendants object to a deed from 
plaintiffs only when the title remained in plaintiffs' sellers (Leland 
A. Fitzgerald and wife). 
Plaintiffs cite two cases to support the proposition that plain-
tiffs need not have marketable title to sustain their action and the 
validity of the deed in question. 
In the Woodward case, the first cited which is reported as l U. 2d 220, 
265 P.2d 398 {1953) plaintiffs there did not sue for the full price as the 
instant plaintiffs have done but "only as a request for judgment as to 
such installments and attorneys' fees~ (P. 399). There the court said: 
Defendant's attack on the marketability of plaintiff's 
title was premature since, under the authorities, that fact 
is determinable, not as of the date of execution of the 
contract but as of the time a vendee tenders that which 
under the contract, would require the vendor to transfer 
not only marketable title, but the title which the latter 
agreed to convey. 
Here the issue of marketability of seller's title is not premature 
because the issue was not raised as of the contract's execution but as of 
the time the contract required the title to pass. At that time the 
quality of the title is most germane to the intention of the parties and 
to the terms of the contract. 
The second case plaintiffs cited on the issue of marketability of 
title is Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 30 U.2d 47, 513 P.2d 417 (1973). 
That case involved an action by sellers to terminate the contract due 
to buyer's breaches and a consolidated action by buyer for specific 
performance rather than a 16 C action under a uniform real estate contract 
6 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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as in this case. There the court, consistent with Woodward, supra, said: 
"First, the law does not require the vendor to have 
clear and marketable title at all times during the 
perfonnance of his contract and is not ordinarily so 
obligated until the time comes for him to perform (undersea ring added). 
In the instant case the time for performance had arrived and unless 
the plaintiffs had such marketable title as would enable them to convey 
good marketable title to defendants as purchasers, then their deed would 
not and did not meet the requirements of 16 C. 
It's true that defendants have not found a case exactly in point to 
sustain their position on this issue as this case is apparently one of 
first impression but certainly neither of the cases cited by plaintiffs 
are anywhere near being "on all fours. 11 In fact their dicta strongly 
supports plaintiffs' position. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the 
lack of precedent in this situation is probably due to the fact that prior 
sellers did not believe they could succeed in obtaining a judgment for the 
full purchase price under 16 C unless they could deliver the full title 
rather than a fraction of the full title since the contract contemplated 
full title for full price. 
As for the two cases cited by plaintiffs regarding the necessity of 
a "tender of deed" those cases would be useless even if they stood for 
the proposition that no such tender would be required in circumstances 
like those in this case since the contractual provision in question 
required plaintiffs to "pass title to buyer" not "tender title to buyer." 
Howe~er the holdings in Vanderwilt v. Broerman, 201 Iowa 1107, 206 NW 559 
7 
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(1926) and Miami Bond and Mortgage Company v. Bell 133 So. 547 {Florida, 
1931) involved factual situations totally different from this case. In 
the first case 11 the suit is under the statute against the vender in 
possession to foreclose" (P. 962). The statute in question {Sec. 4297) 
provided inter alia: 
The vendor may file his petition asking the Court 
to require the purchaser to perform his contract or 
to foreclose and sell his interest in the property. 
The Court in its opinion observed that the lower court "could so mold 
its decree as to protect the interests of a-ll 11 (P. 962). 
The difference between the statute in Vanderwilt and the contract in 
this case is so vast as to make the dicta in that case meaningless in deciding 
rights and duties under this contract. 
In Bell the court said: 
This is not a suit at law to recover the full purchase 
price of the lands to be conveyed nor is it one for specific 
performance of a contract and therefore the rule that "where 
in a contract for the sale of land the covenant of vendee to 
pay the purchase price and the covenant of the vendor to 
convey are dependent and both covenants are to be performed 
at the same time and the tender of deed is a condition 
precedent to an action at law to recover the total purchase 
price and to the maintenance by the vendor of an action in 
equity for specific performance of the contract" is not 
applicable. 
Here the suit was one to recover the full purchase price and is in 
substance an action for specific performance and hence the rule quoted would 
be applicable except for the fact that the contract by its express terms 
required a conveyance rather than a tender as noted above. 
E 
The Error in Plaintiffs' Conveyance of Title Was 
Not Harmless Error and Defendants Were Prejudiced 
Thereby 
8 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It's hard to conceive of a case where there was more prejudice caused 
a party in a case involving sums under half a million dollars than in this 
case. To state as plaintiffs do on Page 10 of their brief that "defendants 
were not prejudiced thereby" is the sheerest of ipse dixit reasoning which 
flies in the face of reality, the reality that defendants have a judgment 
against them for roughly half a million dollars in return for property of 
that approximate value which is subject to a prior encumbrance of over 50% 
of that value. If getting half a loaf for full price of the loaf is not 
prejudicial, that tenn has no meaning. Certainly, neither Startin f237 
P 2d 834, a.1951 case) nor Boyd (146 P 272, a 1915 case) do not stand for 
the proposition that getting half of that bargained for is not prejudicial. 
The first involved the value of services rather than the diminished value 
of property because title is still in sellers' sellers until over 50% of 
the value is paid to them. That case is so extremely remote from the one 
at bar as to be useless. The second is even more remote as it involved a 
tort action for wrongful death. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN 
ACCORD WITH SEC. 78-37-1 AND SEC. 78-37-2, UTAH CODE, 
1953. 
A 
The Fourth Judicial District Court did not Prope.!:lt. 
Adjudge an Amount Due. 
Plaintiffs contend under this point that ''adjudging the amount due" is 
equivalent to "entering judgment for the sum determined to be due." This 
is not so. Certainly it is not necessary that judgment for the amount due 
must be entered as distinguished from fts determination· to "make bids or 
make disbursements to the parties" (P. 11). 
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To interpret Sec. 78-37-1 in the above manner is to defeat its 
purpose, namely to have the debt satisfied primarily by the security in 
question so that other real property of the debtor is not impaired 
pending the detennination of the deficiency, if any. 
B 
Mootness is not an Issue in This Appeal. 
Plaintiffs cite facts outside the record and violate their own urging 
that this Court not consider matters not presented to the lower court. 
It would obviously be improper for this court to adjudicate the legal 
effect of facts accurring after this appeal was instituted and particularly 
when plaintiff sought by the execution sale of July 1, 1982, to do an end 
run around Perkins v. Spencer by the exercise of 16 C and the purchase of 
defendants• position to forfeit all payments made before which effectively 
converted a 16 C remedy into a 16 A remedy in such a manner that the lower 
court had no opportunity to apply the principles of Perkins v. Spencer 
to these facts. That case is reported in 121 U~ 468, 243 P.2d 446. 
CONCLUSION 
The surrnnary judgment appealed from should be reversed and the case 
tried upon its merits. 
Dated this 20th day of September, 1982. 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants 
lQ 
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